CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 15 Control flow: switch(6)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 14 Control flow: if(global_five==5) and if(global_five!=5)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 13 Control flow: if(global_const_five==5) and if(global_const_five!=5)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 12 Control flow: if(global_returns_t_or_f())

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 11 Control flow: if(global_returns_t()) and if(global_returns_f())

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 10 Control flow: if(global_t) and if(global_f)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 09 Control flow: if(global_const_t) and if(global_const_f)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 08 Control flow: if(static_returns_t()) and if(static_returns_f())

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 07 Control flow: if(static_five==5) and if(static_five!=5)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 06 Control flow: if(static_const_five==5) and if(static_const_five!=5)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 05 Control flow: if(static_t) and if(static_f)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 04 Control flow: if(static_const_t) and if(static_const_f)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 03 Control flow: if(5==5) and if(5!=5)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 02 Control flow: if(1) and if(0)

CWE: 114 Process Control BadSource: Environment Read input from an environment variable GoodSource: Hard code the full pathname to the library Sink: BadSink : Load a dynamic link library Flow Variant: 01 Baseline

CWE 15

CWE 15

Tempfile creation should be done in a safe way. To be safe, the temp file function should open up the temp file with appropriate access control. The temp file function should also retain this quality, while being resistant to race conditions. (from TCCLASP-5_6_20_10) (CWE 378)

Test of tool ability to identify an unchecked error condition.

Because of the test for file existence in lines 33 and 35 and the file open on line 36 both use file names. This code contains a TOCTOU - Time of check, Time of use - vulnerability. The code can be exploited by the creation of a symbolic link with the name of the file. From "Secure Coding in C an...

Extremly insecure stdio implementation. The program reads a filename from stdin on line 26 and attemps to open the file on line 26. This program is vulnerable to buffer overflows on line 26 and format string exploit on line 30. From \"Secure Coding in C and C \" by Robert C. Seacord. Page 215, ...

Exploit of buffer overflow in dynamic memory on Windows. This exploit requires that the overwriten memory adress is executable. The HeapFree() on line 38 creates a gap in the contiguous allocated memory. The memcpy() on line 39 is an example of exploit. The first 16 bytes of malArg overwrite the ...

The semantics of virtual functions. As most C++ compilers implement virtual functions using a Virtual Function Table (VTBL). The VTBL is an array of function pointers that is used at runtime for dispatching virtual function calls. It"s possible to overwrite function pointers in the VTBL or change...

Modifying the instruction pointer. The invocation through the function pointer funcPtr uses an indirect reference, and the address inthe referenced location can be overwritten. As the function pointer address cannot be resolved at compiled time, it can be exploited to transfer control to arbitrar...

Buffer overflow by gets() if input is more than 80 characters. From "Secure Coding in C and C++" by Robert C. Seacord. Page 27, Figure 2-1