A Taxonomy of Buffer Overflows for Evaluating Static and Dynamic Software Testing Tools*

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ABSTRACT
A taxonomy that uses twenty-two attributes to characterize C-program overflows was used to construct 291 small C-program test cases that can be used to diagnostically determine the basic capabilities of static and dynamic analysis buffer overflow detection tools. Attributes in the taxonomy include the buffer location (e.g. stack, heap, data region, BSS, shared memory); scope difference between buffer allocation and access; index, pointer, and alias complexity when addressing buffer elements; complexity of the control flow and loop structure surrounding the overflow; type of container the buffer is within (e.g. structure, union, array); whether the overflow is caused by a signed/unsigned type error; the overflow magnitude and direction; and whether the overflow is discrete or continuous. As an example, the 291 test cases were used to measure the detection, false alarm, and confusion rates of five static analysis tools. They reveal specific strengths and limitations of tools and suggest directions for improvements.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

General Terms

Keywords
Security, taxonomy, buffer overflow, static analysis, evaluation, exploit, test, detection, false alarm, source code.

1. INTRODUCTION
Buffer overflows are among the most important types of errors that occur in C code. They are of particular interest as they are potentially exploitable by malicious users, and have historically accounted for a significant percentage of the software vulnerabilities published each year [18, 20], such as in NIST’s ICAT Metabase [9], CERT advisories [1], Bugtraq [17], and other security forums. Buffer overflows have also been the basis for many damaging exploits, such as the Sapphire/Slammer [13] and Blaster [15] worms.

A buffer overflow vulnerability occurs when data can be written outside the memory allocated for a buffer, either past the end or before the beginning. Buffer overflows may occur on the stack, on the heap, in the data segment, or the BSS segment (the memory area a program uses for uninitialized global data), and may overwrite from one to many bytes of memory outside the buffer. Even a one-byte overflow can be enough to allow an exploit [10]. Buffer overflows have been described at length in many papers, including [20], and many descriptions of exploiting buffer overflows can be found online.

This paper focuses on developing a taxonomy of buffer overflows and using the taxonomy to create test cases that can be used to diagnostically evaluate the capabilities of static and dynamic buffer overflow detection tools. The first part of this paper describes the taxonomy and test cases that are available at http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/corpora.html. The second part demonstrates how to use the test cases to evaluate five static analysis tools formerly evaluated by Zitser [20, 21]. While Zitser’s study evaluated the ability of ARCHER [19], BOON [18], Splint [6, 12], UNO [8], and PolySpace C Verifier [14] to detect fourteen known buffer overflows in open-source software, the current evaluation focuses on determining those type of overflows that each tool can detect and those that cause false alarms.

2. BUFFER OVERFLOW TAXONOMY
Using a comprehensive taxonomy makes it possible to develop test cases that cover a wide range of buffer overflows and make diagnostic tool assessments. The most comprehensive previous taxonomy contained thirteen attributes and was developed by Zitser [20]. This taxonomy was modified and expanded to address problems encountered with its application, while still attempting to keep it small and simple enough for practical application. The new taxonomy consists of the twenty-two attributes listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute Number</th>
<th>Attribute Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Write/Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Upper/Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Data Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Memory Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Details on the possible values for each attribute are available in [11], and are summarized below. For each attribute, the possible values are listed in ascending order (i.e. the 0 value first).

**Write/Read:** describes the type of memory access (write, read). While detecting illegal writes is of more interest in preventing buffer overflow exploits, illegal reads could allow unauthorized access to information or could constitute one operation in a multi-step exploit.

**Upper/Lower Bound:** describes which buffer bound is violated (upper, lower). While the term “buffer overflow” suggests an access beyond the upper bound of a buffer, one of the vulnerabilities analyzed by Zitser [21] allowed access below a buffer’s lower bound (e.g. buf[-1]).

**Data Type:** indicates the type of data stored in the buffer (character, integer, floating point, wide character, pointer, unsigned character, unsigned integer). Although character buffers are often manipulated with unsafe string functions in C, and some tools focus on detecting overflows of those buffers, buffers of all types may be overflowed and should be analyzed.

**Memory Location:** indicates where the buffer resides (stack, heap, data region, BSS, shared memory). Non-static variables defined locally to a function are on the stack, while dynamically allocated buffers (e.g., those allocated by calling a malloc function) are on the heap. The data region holds initialized global or static variables, while the BSS region contains uninitialized global or static variables. Shared memory is typically allocated, mapped into and out of a program’s address space, and released via operating system specific functions. While a typical buffer overflow exploit may strive to overwrite a function return value on the stack, buffers in other locations have been exploited and should be considered as well.

**Scope:** describes the difference between where the buffer is allocated and where it is overrun (same, inter-procedural, global, inter-file/inter-procedural, inter-file/global). This is important because many tools perform local and not inter-procedural analyses, and many actual overflows are inter-procedural (e.g. [21]). The scope is local if the buffer is allocated and overrun within the same function. It is inter-procedural if the buffer is allocated in one function and overrun in another function within the same file. Global scope indicates that the buffer is allocated as a global variable, and is overrun in a function within the same file. Scope is inter-file/inter-procedural if the buffer is allocated in a function in one file, and overrun in a function in another file. Inter-file/global scope describes a buffer that is allocated as a global in one file, and overrun in a function in another file. Any scope other than “same” may involve passing the buffer address as an argument to another function; in this case, the Alias of Buffer Address attribute must also be set accordingly. Note that the test suite used in this evaluation does not contain an example for “inter-file/global.”

**Container:** indicates whether the buffer resides in some type of container (no, array, struct, union, array of structs, array of unions). The ability of static analysis tools to detect overflows within containers (e.g., overrunning one array element into the next, or one structure field into the next) and beyond container boundaries (i.e., beyond the memory allocated for the container as a whole) may vary according to how the tools model these containers and their contents.

**Pointer:** indicates whether the buffer access uses a pointer dereference (no, yes). Note that it is possible to use a pointer dereference with or without an array index (e.g. *pBuf or (*pBuf)[10]); the Index Complexity attribute must be set accordingly. In order to know if the memory location referred to by a dereferenced pointer is within buffer bounds, a code analysis tool must keep track of what pointers point to; this points-to analysis is a significant challenge.

**Index Complexity:** indicates the complexity of the array index (constant, variable, linear expression, non-linear expression, function return value, array contents, N/A). This attribute applies only to the user program, and is not used to describe how buffer accesses are performed inside C library functions.

**Address Complexity:** describes the complexity of the address or pointer computation (constant, variable, linear expression, non-linear expression, function return value, array contents, N/A). Again, this attribute is used to describe the user program only, and is not applied to C library function internals.

**Length/Limit Complexity:** indicates the complexity of the length or limit passed to a C library function that overruns the buffer (N/A, none, constant, variable, linear expression, non-linear expression, function return value, array contents). This attribute applies only to the user program, and is not used to describe how buffer accesses are performed inside C library functions.

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## Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alias of Buffer Address</td>
<td>Indicates whether the buffer is accessed directly or through one or two levels of aliasing (no, one, two).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed/Unsigned Mismatch</td>
<td>Indicates whether the buffer data type is signed or unsigned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
second variable to a third and accessing the buffer through the third variable would be classified as two levels of aliasing, as would passing the buffer address to a third function from the second.

**Alias of Buffer Index:** indicates whether or not the index is aliased (no, one, two, N/A). If the index is a constant or the results of a computation or function call, or if the index is a variable which is directly assigned a constant value or the results of a computation or function call, then there is no aliasing of the index. If, however, the index is a variable to which the value of a second variable is assigned, then there is one level of aliasing. Adding a third variable assignment increases the level of aliasing to two. If no index is used in the buffer access, then this attribute is not applicable. This and the previous attribute assess how well tools analyze the difficult problem of aliases.

**Local Control Flow:** describes what kind of program control flow most immediately surrounds or affects the overflow (none, if, switch, cond, goto/label, set jmp/longjmp, function pointer, recursion). For the values “if”, “switch”, and “cond”, the buffer overflow is located within the conditional construct. “Goto/label” signifies that the overflow occurs at or after the target label of a goto statement. Similarly, “set jmp/long jmp” means that the overflow is at or after a longjmp address. Buffer overflows that occur within functions reached via function pointers are assigned the “function pointer” value, and those within recursive functions receive the value “recursion”. The values “function pointer” and “recursion” necessarily imply a global or inter-procedural scope, and may involve an address alias. The **Scope and Alias of Buffer Address** attributes should be set accordingly.

Control flow involves either branching or jumping to another context within the program; hence, only path-sensitive code analysis can determine whether or not the overflow is actually reachable. A code analysis tool must be able to follow function pointers and have techniques for handling recursive functions in order to detect buffer overflows with the last two values for this attribute.

**Secondary Control Flow:** has the same values as **Local Control Flow**, the difference being the location of the control flow construct. **Secondary Control Flow** either precedes the overflow or contains nested, local control flow. Some types of secondary control flow may occur without any local control flow, but some may not. The **Local Control Flow** attribute should be set accordingly.

The following example illustrates an if statement that precedes the overflow and affects whether or not it occurs. Because it precedes the overflow, as opposed to directly containing the overflow, it is labeled as secondary, not local, control flow.

```c
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    int i = 10;
    if (i > 10)
    {
        return 0;
    }
    /* BAD */
    buf[i] = 'A';
}
```

Only control flow that affects whether or not the overflow occurs is classified. In other words, if a preceding control flow construct has no bearing on whether or not the subsequent overflow occurs, it is not considered to be secondary control flow, and this attribute would be assigned the value “none.”

The following example illustrates nested control flow. The inner if statement directly contains the overflow, and we assign the value “if” to the **Local Control Flow** attribute. The outer if statement represents secondary control flow, and we assign the value “if” to the **Secondary Control Flow** attribute as well.

```c
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    int i = 10;
    if (sizeof buf <= 10)
    {
        if (i <= 10)
        {
            /* BAD */
            buf[i] = 'A';
        }
    }
    return 0;
}
```

Some code analysis tools perform path-sensitive analyses, and some do not. Even those that do often must make simplifying approximations in order to keep the problem tractable and the solution scalable. This may mean throwing away some information, and thereby sacrificing precision, at points in the program where previous branches rejoin. Test cases containing secondary control flow may highlight the capabilities or limitations of these varying techniques.

**Loop Structure:** describes the type of loop construct within which the overflow occurs (none, standard for, standard do-while, standard while, non-standard for, non-standard do-while, non-standard while). A “standard” loop is one that has an initialization, a loop exit test, and an increment or decrement of a loop variable, all in typical format and locations. A “non-standard” loop deviates from the standard loop in one or more of these areas. Examples of standard for, do-while, and while loops are shown below, along with one non-standard for loop example:

**Standard for loop:**

```c
for (i=0; i<11; i++)
{
    buf[i] = 'A';
}
```

**Standard do-while loop:**

```c
int i=0;
do
{
    buf[i] = 'A';
    i++;
} while (i<11);
```

**Standard while loop:**

```c
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buf[10];
    int i = 10;
    if (sizeof buf <= 10)
    {
        if (i <= 10)
        {
            /* BAD */
            buf[i] = 'A';
        }
    }
    return 0;
}
```
other than "none" for this attribute requires that the attribute should be set accordingly. Any value (such as additional if statements). In these cases, the runtime conditions; therefore, it may be impossible or impractical for static analysis tools to simulate or analyze loops handling loops; for example, some may attempt to simulate a loop for a fixed number of iterations, while others may employ heuristics to recognize and handle common loop constructs. The approach taken will likely affect a tool's capabilities to detect overflows that occur within various loop structures.

**Loop Complexity**: indicates how many loop components (initialization, test, increment) are more complex than the standard baseline of initializing to a constant, testing against a constant, and incrementing or decrementing by one (N/A, none, one, two, three). Of interest here is whether or not the tools handle loops with varying complexity in general, rather than which particular loop components are handled or not.

**Asynchrony**: indicates if the buffer overflow is potentially obfuscated by an asynchronous program construct (no, threads, forked process, signal handler). The functions that may be used to realize these constructs are often operating system specific (e.g. on Linux, pthread functions; fork, wait, and exit; and signal). A code analysis tool may need detailed, embedded knowledge of these constructs and the O/S-specific functions in order to properly detect overflows that occur only under these special circumstances.

**Taint**: describes whether and how a buffer overflow may be influenced externally (no, argc/argv, environment variables, file read or stdin, socket, process environment). “Taintable” buffer overflows that can be influenced by users external to a program are the most crucial to detect because they make it possible for attackers to create exploits. The occurrence of a buffer overflow may depend on command line or stdin input from a user, the value of environment variables (e.g. getenv), file contents (e.g. fgets, fread, or read), data received through a socket or service (e.g. recv), or properties of the process environment, such as the current working directory (e.g. getcwd). As with asynchronous constructs, code analysis tools may require detailed modeling of O/S-specific functions to properly detect related overflows. Note that the test suite used in this evaluation does not contain an example for “socket.”

**Runtime Environment Dependence**: indicates whether or not the occurrence of the overrun depends on something determined at runtime (no, yes). If the overrun is certain to occur on every execution of the program, it is not dependent on the runtime environment; otherwise, it is. Examples of overflows that depend on the runtime environment include tainted overflows just described and overflows that depend on the value of a random number generator.

**Magnitude**: indicates the size of the overflow (none, 1 byte, 8 bytes, 4096 bytes). “None” is used to classify the “OK” or patched versions of programs that contain overflows. One would expect static analysis tools to detect buffer overflows without regard to the size of the overflow, unless they contain an off-by-one error in their modeling of library functions. The same is not true of dynamic analysis tools that use runtime instrumentation to detect memory violations; different methods may be sensitive to different sizes of overflows, which may or may not breach page boundaries, etc. The various overflow sizes were chosen with dynamic tool evaluations in mind. Overflows of one byte test both the accuracy of static analysis modeling, and the sensitivity of dynamic instrumentation. Eight and 4096 byte overflows are aimed more exclusively at dynamic tool testing, and are designed to cross word-aligned and page boundaries. One byte overflows are of interest because such overflows have enabled past exploits [10].

**Continuous/Discrete**: indicates whether the buffer overflow accesses another arbitrary location outside the buffer directly (discrete) or accesses consecutive elements within the buffer before overflowing past the bounds (continuous). Loop constructs are likely candidates for containing continuous overflows. C library functions that overflow a buffer while copying memory or string contents into it demonstrate continuous overflows. An overflow labeled as continuous should have the loop-related attributes or the Length Complexity attribute (indicating the complexity of the length or limit passed to a C library function) set accordingly. Some dynamic tools rely on “canaries” at buffer boundaries to detect continuous overflows [5], and therefore may miss discrete overflows.

**Signed/Unsigned Mismatch**: indicates if the buffer overflow is caused by using a signed or unsigned value where the opposite is expected (no, yes). Typically, a signed value is used where an unsigned value is expected, and gets interpreted as a very large unsigned or positive value, causing an enormous buffer overflow. This error was responsible for two of the vulnerabilities analyzed by Zitser [21].

This taxonomy is specifically designed for developing simple diagnostic test cases. It may not fully characterize complex buffer overflows that occur in real code, and specifically omits complex details related to the overflow context.

For each attribute (except for Magnitude), the zero value is assigned to the simplest or “baseline” buffer overflow, shown below:

```c
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char buf[10];
    /* BAD */
    buf[10] = 'A';
    return 0;
}
```
Each test case includes a comment line as shown with the word "BAD" or "OK." This comment is placed on the line before the line where an overflow might occur and it indicates whether an overflow does occur. The buffer access in the baseline program is a write operation beyond the upper bound of a stack-based character buffer that is defined and overflowed within the same function. The buffer does not lie within another container, is addressed directly, and is indexed with a constant. No C library function is used to access the buffer, the overflow is not within any conditional or complicated control flows or asynchronous program constructs, and does not depend on the runtime environment. The overflow writes to a discrete location one byte beyond the buffer boundary, and cannot be manipulated by an external user. Finally, it does not involve a signed vs. unsigned type mismatch.

Appending the value digits for each of the twenty-two attributes forms a string that classifies a buffer overflow, which can be referred to during results analysis. For example, the sample program shown above is classified as "000000000000000000000100." The single "1" in this string represents a "Magnitude" attribute indicating a one-byte overflow. This classification information appears in comments at the top of each test case file, as shown in the example below:

```c
/* Taxonomy Classification: 0000000000000000000000 */
/*
 * WRITE/READ       0 write
 * WHICH BOUND      0 upper
 * DATA TYPE        0 char
 * MEMORY LOCATION  0 stack
 * SCOPE            0 same
 * CONTAINER        0 no
 * POINTER          0 no
 * INDEX COMPLEXITY 0 constant
 * ADDRESS COMPLEXITY 0 constant
 * LENGTH COMPLEXITY 0 N/A
 * ADDRESS ALIAS    0 none
 * INDEX ALIAS      0 none
 * LOCAL CONTROL FLOW 0 none
 * SECONDARY CONTROL FLOW 0 none
 * LOOP STRUCTURE   0 no
 * LOOP COMPLEXITY  0 N/A
 * ASYNCHRONY       0 no
 * TAINT            0 no
 * RUNTIME ENV. DEPENDENCE 0 no
 * MAGNITUDE        0 no overflow
 * CONTINUOUS/DISCRETE 0 discrete
 * SIGNEDNESS       0 no
*/
```

While the Zitser test cases were program pairs consisting of a bad program and a corresponding patched program, this evaluation uses program quadruplets. The four versions of each test case correspond to the four possible values of the Magnitude attribute. One version represents a patched program (no overflow), while the remaining three indicate buffer overflows of one, eight, and 4096 bytes denoted as minimum, medium, and large overflows.

3. TEST SUITE
A full discussion of design considerations for creating test cases is provided in [11]. Goals included avoiding tool bias; providing samples that cover the taxonomy; measuring detections, false alarms, and confusions; naming and documenting test cases to facilitate automated scoring and encourage reuse; and maintaining consistency in programming style and use of programming idioms.

Ideally, the test suite would have at least one instance of each possible buffer overflow that could be described by the taxonomy. Unfortunately, the vast number of attribute combinations this requires makes this impractical. Instead, a “basic” set of test cases was built by first choosing a simple, baseline example of a buffer overflow, and then varying its characteristics one at a time. This strategy results in taxonomy coverage that is heavily weighted toward the baseline attribute values. Variations were added by automated code-generation software written in Perl that produces C code for the test cases to help insure consistency and make it easier to add test cases.

Four versions of 291 different test cases were generated with no overflow and with minimum, medium, and large overflows. Each test case was compiled with gcc, the GNU C compiler [7], on Linux to verify that the programs compiled without warnings or errors (with the exception of one test case that produces an unavoidable warning). Overflows were verified using CRED, a fine-grained bounds-checking extension to gcc that detects overflows at run time [16], or by verifying that the large overflow caused a segfault. A few problems with test cases that involved complex loop conditions were also corrected based on initial results produced by the PolySpace tool.

4. EXAMPLE TEST CASE USAGE
As an example of how to use these diagnostic test cases, each test case (291 quadruplets) was used one at a time with five static analysis tools (ARCHER, BOON, PolySpace, Splint, and UNO). Tool-specific Perl programs parsed the output and determined whether a buffer overflow was detected on the line immediately following the comment in each test case. Details of the test procedures are provided in [11]. No annotations were added and no modifications were made to the source code for any tool.

5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
All five static analysis tools performed the same regardless of overflow size (this would not necessarily hold for dynamic analysis). To simplify the discussion, results for the three magnitudes of overflows are thus reported as results for “bad” test cases as a whole.

Table 2 shows overall performance metrics computed for each tool. These metrics do not indicate performance expected in real code for detecting new vulnerabilities. They only indicate overall performance across all test cases and are preliminary to more diagnostic analysis with individual test cases. The detection rate indicates how well a tool detects the known buffer overflows in the bad programs, while the false alarm rate indicates how often a tool reports a buffer overflow in the patched programs. The confusion rate indicates how well a tool can distinguish between the bad and patched programs. When a tool reports a detection in both the patched and bad versions of a
test case, the tool has demonstrated “confusion.” The formulas used to compute these three metrics are shown below:

\[
\text{detection rate} = \frac{\text{# test cases where tool reports overflow in bad version}}{\text{# test cases tool evaluated}}
\]

\[
\text{false alarm rate} = \frac{\text{# test cases where tool reports overflow in patched version}}{\text{# of test cases tool evaluated}}
\]

\[
\text{confusion rate} = \frac{\text{# test cases where tool reports overflow in both bad and patched version}}{\text{# test cases where tool reports overflow in bad version}}
\]

As seen in Table 2, ARCHER and PolySpace both have detection rates exceeding 90%. PolySpace’s detection rate is nearly perfect, missing only one out of the 291 possible detections. PolySpace produced seven false alarms, whereas ARCHER produced none. Splint and UNO each detected roughly half of the overflows. Splint, however, produced a substantial number of false alarms, while UNO produced none. Splint also exhibited a fairly high confusion rate. In over twenty percent of the cases where it properly detected an overflow, it also reported an error in the patched program. PolySpace’s confusion rate was substantially lower, while the other three tools had no confusions. BOON’s detection rate across the test suite was extremely low.

Table 2. Overall Performance on Basic Test Suite (291 cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Detection Rate</th>
<th>False Alarm Rate</th>
<th>Confusion Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCHER</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOON</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PolySpace</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splint</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that it was not necessarily the design goal of each tool to detect every possible buffer overflow. BOON, for example, focuses only on the misuse of string manipulation functions, and therefore is not expected to detect other overflows. It is also important to realize that these performance rates are not necessarily predictive of how the tools would perform on buffer overflows in actual, released code. The basic test suite used in this evaluation was designed for diagnostic purposes, and the taxonomy coverage exhibited is not representative of that which would be seen in real-world buffer overflows.

Figure 1 presents a plot of detection rate vs. false alarm rate for each tool. Each tool’s performance is plotted with a single data point representing detection and false alarm percentages. The diagonal line represents the hypothetical performance of a random guesser that decides with equal probability if each commented buffer access in the test programs results in an overflow or not. The difference between a tool’s detection rate and the random guesser’s is only statistically significant if it lies more than two standard deviations (roughly 6 percentage points when the detection rate is 50%) away from the random guesser line at the same false alarm rate. In this evaluation, every tool except BOON performs significantly better than a random guesser. In Zitser’s evaluation [20], only PolySpace was significantly better. This difference in performance reflects the simplicity of the diagnostic test cases.

Figure 1. False Alarm and Detection Rates per Tool

Execution times for the five tools were measured as the total time to run each test case, including tool startup time, and are provided in Table 3. PolySpace’s high detection rate comes at the cost of dramatically long execution times. ARCHER demonstrated both the second highest detection rate and the second highest execution time. Splint and UNO, with intermediate detection rates, had the two fastest execution times. BOON’s slightly longer execution time did not result in a higher detection rate.

Table 3. Tool Execution Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Total Time (secs)</th>
<th>Average Time per Test Case (secs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCHER</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOON</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PolySpace</td>
<td>200,820 (56 hrs)</td>
<td>172.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splint</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Detailed Tool Diagnostics

The following paragraphs discuss each tool’s performance in detail, especially compared to the tools’ design goals.

ARCHER is designed to be inter-procedural, path-sensitive, context-sensitive, and aware of pointer aliases. It performs a fully-symbolic, bottom-up data flow analysis, while maintaining symbolic constraints between variables (handled by a linear constraint solver). ARCHER checks array accesses, pointer dereferences, and function calls that take a pointer and size. It is hard-coded to recognize and handle a small number of memory-related functions, such as malloc [19].

ARCHER provided a 91% detection rate with no false alarms. Most of its twenty-seven missed detections are easily explained
by its limitations. Twenty of these were inter-procedural and these include fourteen cases that call C library functions, including the relatively common memcpy(). The other inter-procedural misses include cases involving shared memory, function pointers, recursion, and simple cases of passing a buffer address through one or two functions. Of the remaining seven misses, three involve function return values, two depend on array contents, and two involve function pointers and recursion.

These diagnostic results may explain ARCHER’s poor performance in [20]. In this previous evaluation, that used model programs containing real code, ARCHER detected only one overflow. Of the thirteen model programs for which ARCHER reported no overflows, twelve contained buffer overflows that would be classified according to this evaluation’s taxonomy as having inter-procedural scope, and nine of those involve calls to C library functions. To perform well against a body of real code, C library functions and other inter-procedural buffer overflows need to be detected accurately.

**BOON**’s analysis is flow-insensitive and context-insensitive for scalability and simplicity. It focuses exclusively on the misuse of string manipulation functions, and the authors intentionally sacrificed precision for scalability [18].

In this evaluation, BOON detected only two out of fourteen string function overflows, with no false alarms. The two detected overflows involve the use of strcpy() and fgets(). BOON failed to detect the second case that calls strcpy(), all six cases that call strncpy(), the case that calls getcwd, and all four cases that call memchr(). Despite the heavy use of C library string functions in [20], BOON achieved only two detections in that prior evaluation as well. These results suggest that more complex analyses are required than provided in BOON to detect both real-world and simple buffer overflows.

**PolySpace** is the only commercial tool included in this evaluation. Although details of its methods and implementation are proprietary, its approach uses techniques described in several published works, including: symbolic analysis, or abstract interpretation [2]; escape analysis, for determining inter-procedural side effects [4]; and inter-procedural alias analysis for pointers [3].

PolySpace missed only one detection in this evaluation, which was a case involving a signal handler. PolySpace’s detection rate was not nearly as high in Zitser’s evaluation [20]. Presumably, the additional complexity of real code led to approximations to keep the problem tractable, but at the expense of precision. PolySpace reported seven false alarms across the test cases and many false alarms in Zitser’s evaluation. In both evaluations, the majority of false alarms occurred for overflows involving calls to C library functions.

**Splint** employs “lightweight” static analysis and heuristics that are practical, but neither sound nor complete. Like many other tools, it trades off precision for scalability. It implements limited flow-sensitive control flow, merging possible paths at branch points. Splint uses heuristics to recognize loop idioms and determine loop bounds without resorting to more costly and accurate abstract evaluation. An annotated C library is provided, but the tool relies on the user to properly annotate all other functions to support inter-procedural analysis. Splint exhibited high false alarm rates in the developers’ own tests [6, 12]. The basic test suite used in this evaluation was not annotated for Splint because it is unrealistic to expect annotations for most applications of static analysis tools.

Splint exhibited the highest false alarm rate of any tool. Many of the thirty-five false alarms are attributable to inter-procedural cases; cases involving increased complexity of the index, address, or length; and more complex containers and flow control constructs. The vast majority, 120 out of 127, of missed detections are attributable to loops. Detections were missed in all of the non-standard for() loop cases (both discrete and continuous), as well as in most of the other continuous loop cases. The only continuous loop cases handled correctly are the standard for loops, and Splint produces false alarms on nearly all of those. In addition, it misses the lower bound case, the “cond” case of local flow control, the taint case that calls getcwd, and all four of the signed/unsigned mismatch cases.

While Splint’s detection rate was similar in this evaluation and the Zitser evaluation [20], its false alarm rate was much higher in the latter. Again, this is presumably because code that is more complex results in more situations where precision is sacrificed in the interest of scalability, with the loss of precision leading to increased false alarms. Splint’s weakest area is loop handling. Enhancing loop heuristics to more accurately recognize and handle non-standard for loops, as well as continuous loops of all varieties, would significantly improve performance. Reducing the false alarm rate is also important.

**UNO** is an acronym for uninitialized variables, null-pointer dereferencing, and out-of-bounds array indexing, which are the three types of problems it is designed to address. UNO is not inter-procedural with respect to out-of-bounds array indexing and does not model function pointers, function return values, or computed indices [8].

UNO produced no false alarms in the basic test suite, but did miss nearly half of the possible detections (140 out of 291), most of which would be expected based on the tool’s description. This included every inter-procedural case, every container case, nearly every index complexity case, every address and length complexity case, every address alias case, the function and recursion cases, every signed/unsigned mismatch, nearly every continuous loop, and a small assortment of others. It performed well on the various data types, index aliasing, and discrete loops. UNO exhibited a similar low detection rate in Zitser’s evaluation [20].

**7. CONCLUSIONS**

A new taxonomy was used to construct a corpus of 291 small C-program test cases that can be used to evaluate static and dynamic analysis buffer overflow detection tools. This corpus is available at [http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/corpora.html](http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/corpora.html). These test cases provide a benchmark to measure detection, false alarm, and confusion rates of tools, and can be used to find areas for tool enhancement. Evaluations of five tools validated the utility of this corpus and provide diagnostic results that demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of these tools. Some tools provide very good detection rates (e.g. ARCHER and PolySpace) while others fall short of their specified design goals, even for simple, uncomplicated source code. Diagnostic results provide specific suggestions to improve tool performance (e.g. for Splint, improve modeling of complex loop structures; for ARCHER, improve inter-procedural analysis). They also demonstrate that
the false alarm and confusion rates of some tools (e.g. Splint) need to be reduced.

The test cases we have developed can serve as a type of litmus test for tools. Good performance on test cases that fall within the design goals of a tool is a prerequisite for good performance on actual, complex code. Additional code complexity in actual code often exposes weaknesses of the tools that result in inaccuracies, but rarely improves tool performance. This is evident when comparing test case results obtained in this study to results obtained by Zitser [20] with more complex model programs.

The test corpus could be improved by adding test cases to cover attribute values currently underrepresented, such as string functions.

8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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9. REFERENCES


